Abstract. -This paper studies the negotiation of national identity in Mexico
Mexico City has long been home to a small, but influential community of Germans. This colony defines itself as those Germans and their descendants who pursue "respectable trades" and subsidize German-language institutions in Mexico City. Composed mainly of merchant families, this colony began with fifty individuals in the 1820s, only to grow to three thousand people by 1939. 1 As the usage of the word "colony" illustrates, foreign merchant communities in Latin America lived in a Mediterranean tradition transferred by Iberian conquistadors to the New World. Merchant "colonies" date back to the cities of Renaissance Italy, where mer-become lackeys of the geopolitical interests; and the Germans gradually came to accept Mexican culture. Therefore, an approach that stresses the ambiguities of the immigrant experience such as transnational theory comes closest to matching the German experience in Mexico City. 7 The following pages examine three stages of national identity in the German colony. The "formative phase" (1821-94) created a protodiaspora: a sojourner community characterized by the remigration of Handelskonquistadoren, 8 or trade conquistadors, after a few successful years in Mexico. During the "enclave phase" , the Germans created a mature diaspora in Mexico that included a German school and a host of other social and cultural institutions. Finally, the "assimilationist phase" has marked the gradual absorption of the old German colony into the Mexican bourgeoisie since 1945, and the emergence of a poly-diaspora of several different groups within the larger German community.
Nineteenth-century Mexico attracted few of the traditional immigrants that characterized German diasporas elsewhere in the Americas. The country lacked the abundance of available farmland that made Argentina and the United States into desired destinations for European immigrants. For artisans, low wages and a glut of skilled crafts people made a migration to Mexico similarly unpalatable, and professionals bemoaned the lack of opportunity in a country with a tiny middle class. Until mid-century, merchants and intellectuals predominated among a mere trickle of German immigrants. Moreover, Mexico's protracted nineteenth-century crisis discouraged newcomers. The Wars of Independence (1810-21) left the country's economy ruined and central authority severely weakened. In the succeeding decades, Mexico experienced four major foreign invasions, in no small measure due to the fact that caudillo warlords successfully disputed central authority in Mexico. During the 1830s and 1840s, Mexican commerce hit rock bottom, as banditry threatened overland trade. The merchants in particular saw opportunities for enrichment in a country in which the exodus of the native Spanish merchant elite after independence had severely weakened the network of distribution of imported merchandise. 9 Even these opportunities for immigrants, however, were very limited in nineteenth-century Mexico. The country lacked a base of customers for foreign goods. The Mexican peasant majority did not have the means to buy foreign-made goods, and the urban middle class remained too small to stimulate imports. 10 As a result of the risks involved, most wholesale merchants operated only on a commission basis, a practice that limited them to doing business with "trustworthy" retailers in larger Mexican towns. The typical wholesale merchant sold from an almacén, a strategically located and usually wellguarded warehouse store owned by a scion of a European export business clan. In addition, various Mexican administrations had experimented with the idea of outlawing foreign ownership of retail businesses, an idea that could only further discourage foreign capitalists.
11
By the middle of the century, however, rewards beckoned for German merchants in particular. During the 1840s, most of the British almacén owners withdrew from the import business in favor of investing in mining and banking, leaving German and French immigrants to control wholesale trade. The political climate also became more favorable. During the 1850s, the Liberal Reforma attempted to foster free trade and individual ownership of land.
12 Initially, the Liberals' continued struggles with their Conservative rivals precluded an implementation of many of these measures. Ironically, it was Emperor Maximilian, called onto the scene by a French-Conservative alliance, who ensured the triumph of their program. In a betrayal of his backers, Maximilian supported the Reforma, and he ended discriminatory legislation that had discouraged immigration. Enticed by the prospect of living under an Austrian ruler, thousands of German-speaking immigrants flocked to Mexico after 1864. Although most of them returned after Maximilian's execution in 1867, a prominent German presence in Mexico City remained.
13
Most German wholesale merchants in Mexico City came as trade conquistadors, and they therefore represented a special case among immigrants to the Americas. Most immigrants were migrants of need, as they fled persecution or poverty in their home country. Most trade conquistadors, on the other hand, were migrants of choice who desired to get rich quickly in order to return to a position in their father's business. Not surprisingly, these men typically considered themselves temporary residents rather than immigrants. Since most entrepreneurs anticipated a stay in Mexico of relatively short duration, they sent their profits home rather than commit significant capital investments to the host society. They usually did not take families with them; instead, the typical merchant arrived as a bachelor in his early to mid-twenties. Sharing the predominant view that "whiter" was better, he consorted primarily with fellow merchants from the country of his birth, and segregated himself from the society around him.
14 Prevailing attitudes among the Mexican elite furthered the gulf that separated the immigrants from their host society. As the old adage "Mexico: mother of foreigners and stepmother of Mexicans" indicates, European immigrants enjoyed a social prestige higher than that of many wealthy Mexicans.
15
The self-segregation of the propertied immigrant in nineteenth-century Mexico City assumed three forms. Most importantly, the foreign resident avoided private contact with Mexicans. Second, he stuck to people from his own social class, religious denomination, and profes-
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The Life Cycle of a Trade Diaspora sion. For example, German merchants (who vastly outnumbered immigrants from other social groups in the 19th century) did not associate with mine workers. Third, the resident did nothing to make his stay in Mexico appear permanent. He usually married a wife from Germany, he did not invest in local production, manufacturing, or real estate, and he did not seek Mexican citizenship. 16 Thus, the German colony of about 350 became a wealthy version of what sociologists term sojourner communities -communities made up of temporary migrants. Three out of four of the Germans were male, and almost all of the women were married. Although deep social divisions marked the German community, merchants unquestionably dominated the scene. Because most of them had made plans to return to their native country before starting a family, their interest in social life remained slight: as their only significant social club, they attended the Deutsches Haus, or German house. Founded in 1848 in an effort to unify German expatriates divided in their political loyalties, the Deutsches Haus soon became the central meeting point of all Germans in Mexico City. In the absence of other associations such as schools, churches, athletic clubs and beneficent associations, the German sojourner community did not yet become a diaspora in the true sense. German entrepreneurs expressed little interest in intermarrying with the Mexican elite, although doing so might have enhanced their social position. Instead, the Germans (like the British and the handful of U.S. citizens who lived in Mexico) belonged to the most segregated foreign communities in pre-1867 Mexico. 17 In contrast to British and U.S. immigrants, however, the Germans could not count on a powerful nationstate to back their interests. Not surprisingly, it took the two processes of Mexican modernization and German unification to create a genuine German diaspora.
Benito Juárez's triumph over Maximilian in June 1867, then, signaled a watershed in the history of the German merchant colony. With the final victory of the Liberals, Mexico entered an era of export-led economic growth that contributed to greater political stability during the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911). Juárez and Díaz seized the opportunity afforded by the rapid industrialization of the North Atlantic economies. These economies emerged as major markets for Mexico's products, as well as sources of foreign capital. During the Díaz era, the Porfirians built a network of railroads, which led to a revival of the mining industry and a surge in the production of tropical products.
18 Like Juárez's Liberals, they also dreamed of "whitening" Mexico by a mass agrarian immigration -a project doomed to failure due to the continuing social conditions in the countryside. Don Porfirio and his advisers sought to learn the best that Europe and the United States had to offer in order to elevate Mexico from tradition into modernity. Rather than a specific set of economic or political ideas, Porfirian thought was a persuasion: a widespread notion that Mexico would one day share the limelight with the world's most "advanced" nations such as Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. 19 Meanwhile, German unification created the conditions for political and economic expansion into Latin America. As much as the industrial revolution had paved Otto von Bismarck's way to the unified German Empire, the elimination of internal borders fostered industrialization and, subsequently, the search for export markets. In Mexico, German industrialists found a willing buyer of hardware, weapons, and chemical products, and the diplomats of the new centralized state soon identified it as a key area in which German exporters could displace their British and French competitors. This effort met with limited success. During the 1880s and 1890s, Germany lost lucrative banking and arms concessions to the French, yet became the fourth most important exporter to Mexico. While German exports to Mexico finally came to surpass both of their European rivals during the 1900s, European powers as a whole lost out to the United States, by 1910 the origin of 70 per cent of Mexican imports.
20
The Porfirian/imperial era changed the way German merchants did business in Mexico. With political stability and the existence of an export-oriented infrastructure, the Porfirians had created the potential for the type of national market that benefited specialty stores. While
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The Life Cycle of a Trade Diaspora the French monopolized the sale of expensive imported textiles, and the Spaniards dominated retail trading and the sale of dry goods, the German merchants specialized in hardware, drugs, dyes, and musical instruments. German hardware stores sold cutlery, tools, machinery, agricultural and mining implements, carriages, and sewing machinesin sum, the equipment necessary to build an infrastructure in Mexico. Despite the fact that Germany had arrived belatedly on the industrial stage, merchants from Hamburg, Bremen, and Remscheid emerged as the primary hardware wholesalers in Mexico City. 21 The German hardware merchants soon found themselves at the cutting edge of building the infrastructure of the presumed "prosperous Mexico", 22 and they realized large profits in a relatively short period.
The German colony therefore became a part of the cosmopolitan elite in Porfirian Mexico. To the dismay of the German imperial government, German entrepreneurs cooperated with their colleagues from other countries. For example, in 1877, several German merchants signed a petition of "American residents" to U.S. President Rutherford R. Hayes that demanded that he should not recall the U.S. consul from Mexico City, an action that threatened imports of U.S. hardware. 23 In 1888, the eminent hardware importers Roberto Boker y Cía. even allowed the U.S. Consulate to conduct financial transactions via the company. 24 Therefore, national allegiance mattered less than making money in a setting friendly to foreign economic interests. 25 By the turn of the century, the German sojourner community had transformed itself into an ethnic enclave. According to a 1914 census by the German consul, the German population in the capital numbered 1,236 adults, not counting Austrian, Swiss, or naturalized Mexican citizens. 32 percent of the adult population was female (up from 25 percent in 1865) and the census counted more than four hundred children. Therefore, the nuclear family had surpassed the single trade conquistador in importance within the German community. 26 This larger and more socially diverse population spawned the emergence of a host of new German institutions. In 1912, a German travel guide to Mexico listed a German newspaper, the Deutsche Zeitung von Mexico, as well as fourteen associations: sporting clubs devoted to rowing, horseback riding, swimming, and gymnastics, two Masonic lodges, a Women's Association, and a German school. 27 The foundation of the school constituted the most important moment in the transition from loose diaspora to ethnic enclave. In 1894, the Deutsche Schule von Mexico/Colegio Alemán de México opened its doors, a school financed by German businesses and a generous subsidy from the German Empire. While the school initially offered instruction in the first six grades only, gradual expansion allowed it to offer secondary education as well. In 1918, the Colegio Alemán graduated its first high school class, and four years later, it became the first school outside Europe to win the approval of the German authorities for the Abitur degree. 28 The Colegio Alemán pursued a threefold mission: to educate German children in the tradition of their ancestors, to teach Germans what they needed to know about Mexico, and to acquaint Mexicans with German culture. Since the school could not attract enough German students, it offered two different tracks -one for native speakers, and one for Mexicans who studied German as a foreign language. Since 1905, with the exception of a few years during the Nazi period, students in the Mexican track have outnumbered those in the German track. Teachers imparted knowledge of both cul-
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The Life Cycle of a Trade Diaspora tures. 29 Beginning in 1913, the wave of jingoism that engulfed the European nations swept up the Colegio Alemán. The new principal, a career administrator who knew nothing about Mexico until his arrival, saw the school as a mouthpiece for German propaganda and desired to keep it separate from Mexican society. By 1915, the principal had firmly integrated the school into the German war effort. In a speech to the school's administrative council, he enjoined all those present to "remove everything within us that is not German, and to resist the internationalist disintegration of our thoughts". Final examinations reflected exactly such efforts: for example, an essay question asked students to "describe all that has been done by the German colony in Mexico to help their native country in the European War". By 1919, a new mission statement proclaimed that the goal of the school was to "practice German discipline [...] and to open eyes and minds of its charges to the German character and German knowledge".
30
Efforts to promote German churches experienced far greater difficulties than the school. With the option of worshipping in Mexican churches, German Catholics did not organize until the late 1910s, and by then, the revolutionary state's attack on the organized church did not allow the foundation of a German Catholic Church. A majority among the Germans in Mexico City, the Lutherans experienced somewhat greater success. Since 1861, they had congregated in a variety of buildings, including a monastery, the British Episcopal Church, and a concert hall, where, as the German pastor reported, "lewd decorations featuring Venus and lovebirds threatened the quiet devotion of [...] visitors". 31 In 1930, the Lutheran umbrella organization in Berlin began to provide financial backing for the construction of a church building, as well as a subsidy for the pastor. Because the merchant elite lacked interest, however, the building project languished until 1957. 32 Not The development of the Colegio Alemán and the Lutheran Church epitomized the change in foreign expatriate diasporas in Mexico City. As these communities grew in size, and as the home societies that helped sustain them fought a global war, they isolated themselves from each other. The foreign enclaves also widened the gulf that separated them from Mexican society at large. In the words of one member of the German colony, the Germans led a "life under the bell jar". Until the 1950s, this bell jar enclosed the "old" German families to such an extent that German, and not Spanish, remained the first language even of those born in Mexico. In most merchant families, the children were forbidden to speak Spanish inside the family home, apart from necessary communication with the Mexican servants that tended to the family's needs. The existence of a sizable German colony with its own cultural and social institutions therefore allowed the merchants to raise their children in an expatriate German environment. 34 Nothing describes this cloistered existence better than the observations made by U.S. sociologist Ethelyn C. Davis about the typical Mexican-born child of foreign parents. The following passage reflects her own experience growing up in Mexico City:
"His contacts with Mexicans seldom exceed those of his parents. He usually attends the American school; if he does find Mexican playmates they speak English and are learning his ways [...] He is cared for by a maid over whom he soon learns to assume authority; he is not required to do anything for himself and becomes dependent upon servants for his needs. So long as he remains in Mexico he is not in a position between the two cultures and there is little conflict in his situation. It is when he leaves Mexico that he finds conflicts because life there has not equipped him to meet the conditions which he finds in the United States. It is when he leaves Mexico that he finds himself in a marginal position." The life under the bell jar thus typified the foreign enclaves in Mexico City. With the exception of the Spaniards, who intermarried with the Mexican elite, these colonies cultivated a sense of separateness, both from one another and from Mexican society. World War I only accentuated the forces that militated in favor of self-segregation. After many decades during which the Germans had coexisted with other immigrant communities in Mexico City, the war drew a line between the German speakers on the one hand, and the British, French, and U.S. colonies on the other hand. While the foreigners initially feared the Mexican Revolution more than they did each other, after 1915 the reestablishment of order brought the imperial rivalries to the fore. That year, the German legation sponsored the creation of the Verband Deutscher Reichsangehöriger, or Confederation of Citizens of the German Reich. The VDR not only collected contributions to the German war effort and spread pro-German propaganda in the Mexico City press; it also helped enforce political conformity among the German colony. According to the slightly paranoid U.S. Ambassador Henry P. Fletcher, VDR members even trained Mexican Boy Scouts in the goose step made famous by the Prussian army. 36 Thus, the German colony appeared, at least to the outside, united in its support for the German war effort. The sons of many merchants enlisted in the German military, and the colony greeted each notice that one of them had died with cries of patriotic pride. Finally, black lists barred the nationals of each of these countries from trading with the enemy, and an important incentive for international cooperation thus disappeared.
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Despite this ground swell of nationalist fervor, the Mexican Revolution (1910-40) might have ended the self-segregation of the German colony. Beginning as a broad opposition movement against dictator Díaz, the revolutionary coalition disintegrated soon after its triumph in 1911, which led to six years of factional fighting among agrarian movements, upper-and middle-class nationalists, urban workers, and counterrevolutionaries. To the disgust of the foreign merchants, who soon wistfully bemoaned the passing of a golden age, the revolutionaries shared a desire to end the privileges that wealthy foreigners had enjoyed in Porfirian Mexico. Moreover, the turmoil forced the foreign colonies to cooperate: while their sons killed each other in the trench war, merchants from seventeen different countries formed an "International Committee" to ward off ransacking generals and forced loans. 38 Finally, the revolutionary Constitution of 1917 contained provisions such as the nationalization of land and subsoil and the idea that foreign diplomats could not protect their citizens to the extent that such a protection exempted foreigners from Mexican law. If carried out to the letter, this new constitution would have posed a serious challenge to the German enclave.
A discussion of Mexican immigration law, however, demonstrates that foreign enclaves weathered the nationalist aspects of the Revolution with relative ease. Porfirian immigration law respected the fact that most immigrants did not wish their children to become Mexicans by virtue of their birth in Mexico. Although the Constitution of 1857 espoused the principle of ius soli, the law stipulated that a Mexicanborn child of foreign parents would retain his or her father's citizenship if the father desired it. Not until 1933 did an immigration reform close this loophole, and even then, the German practice of ius sanguinis allowed dual German-Mexican citizenship. While propertied newcomers continued to enjoy an open door in Mexico, the new legislation sought to keep out lower-class immigrants of modest means, who after 1918 made up the bulk of immigration. In 1936, President Lázaro Cárdenas signed a law designed to promote the miscegenation of the 287
The Life Cycle of a Trade Diaspora foreign communities by waiving immigration requirements for those who married women of "Mexican origin". 39 These measures, however, were not successful. By the eve of World War II, the German colony had more than doubled in size, as immigration restrictions in the United States forced an increasing number of lower-and middle-class migrants to look elsewhere for a new home. Intermarriage remained the exception rather than the rule, and most Germans continued to cling to their identification with the homeland. 40 Thus, the Revolution in fact did not harm the position of German merchants in Mexico City. To be sure, the widespread political chaos made wholesale trading difficult, and during the worst years of fighting, retail sales slumped to a small fraction of pre-1910 levels. Once the German merchants had endured these difficult years, however, better days lay ahead. New president Venustiano Carranza favored German investments as a counterweight to U.S. influence. In fact, Carranza expressed such pro-German sentiments that U.S. and German diplomats believed that he might enter a Mexican-German alliance. Hence, the ill-fated Zimmermann Telegram, which proposed such an alliance, helped bringing the United States into the war with Germany, and gave U.S. Ambassador Henry P. Fletcher occasion to frequent tirades against German influence in Mexico. 41 In addition, once the most intense fighting had ended, merchants charged for their wares in gold pesos, taking advantage of the fact that many Mexicans had hoarded gold coins during the time of worthless paper money.
42
Not surprisingly, the life of Germans in Mexico differed from that of their compatriots at home. While the Germans in Mexico enjoyed prosperity and a high social status despite the Revolution, most of Germany saw the same period as a time of war, hunger, national humiliation, runaway inflation, and sluggish economic growth. As a result of this discrepancy, the old German families cherished an image of a mother country that no longer corresponded to reality. Perhaps inevitably, this desire to cling to past greatness contributed to an almost unanimous rejection of the Weimar Republic among the German merchant colony in Mexico City. 43 The issue that best demonstrated this conservative opposition to the Weimar Republic was the Flaggenstreit, or the debate over the German flag. The official flag of the Weimar Republic was black, red, and gold, since the Napoleonic Wars the flag of German democrats. The vast majority of Germans in Latin America refused to recognize these colors, preferring the black, white, and red flag of the empire. 44 In 1922, a poll taken by the VDR manifested the attitude of most Germans in Mexico: 1,800 Germans favored the imperial flag, and only two the black, red, and gold. 45 The old merchant families felt so strongly about this issue that they did not mind affronting the government in Berlin. In 1920, for instance, the German owner of the building that housed the German consulate took down the consulate's black, red, and gold flag, and hoisted the black, white, and red one instead. Unable to find a German landlord who supported him in the Flaggenstreit, the consul moved his offices to the German legation. 46 Not surprisingly, most of the Germans in Mexico reacted with undisguised glee to the news that Adolf Hitler had been appointed Chancellor. As early as 1930, they had not only hoped for a right-wing coup d'état, but many of them had expressed overt Nazi and antiSemitic sentiments. 47 Merchants supported Hitler for a variety of reasons, including the humiliation of Germany after the lost world war, the promise of the radical right to assist German commercial outposts, fears of communism in both Mexico and Germany, and a firebrand "Idealism of the expatriate German" for an ideology that created a strong cultural and political bond between the fatherland and the Ger-
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The Life Cycle of a Trade Diaspora man diaspora. In many ways, the German colony in Mexico City had long operated as a microcosm of what the Nazis desired to accomplish among all Volksdeutsche, or people of German culture. 48 Moreover, Germans of Jewish descent held no prominent positions in the organizations of the colony. Finally, if anyone among the old merchant clans had doubts about the Nazis, their company's dependence on German imports made them think twice before opposing Hitler in public. 49 Nonetheless, Nazi efforts to unify all Volksdeutsche encountered limited success. Hitler's minister, Baron Rüdt von Collenberg, had little trouble bringing the expatriate Germans into line with Nazi policies, and at least one hundred fifty Germans joined the Nazi party. 50 In particular, recent immigrants, which made up almost half of all Germans in Mexico City, enthusiastically supported the Nazi cause. Dependent on a government subsidy from Berlin, the German school alienated scores of Mexican students and parents and wholly dedicated itself to teaching Nazi ideology. By 1939, all institutions of the German colony answered to the Auslandsorganisation (AO). The AO also supervised the activities of the small local branch of the Nazi party, it attempted to bribe Mexican politicians, and it helped German intelligence operations. 51 These same totalitarian policies, however, created a dissident German-speaking diaspora, as more than 2,000 German exiles, among them many intellectuals, artists, and leftist politicians, soon joined a small number of German anti-fascists in Mexico. These new immigrants wasted no time attacking Hitler's totalitarian state. 52 Given this new diversity in the German population, the Nazi goal of ideological conformity among German speakers in Mexico remained elusive. To the chagrin of von Collenberg, cooperation in economic and political matters proved even harder to achieve. While his efforts to eliminate the sale of U.S., British, and French goods in stores owned by native Germans succeeded, the old German businesses balked at such limitations. Even more importantly, the owners of many of these enterprises would neither lay off their Jewish employees nor join the Nazi party. Not only did these companies depend on their long-standing cooperation with U.S. enterprises, but their directors also knew that an exclusive reliance on German products would guarantee their inclusion in U.S. blacklists in case of war. Instead, companies like the Casa Boker officially divested themselves of their German shareholders. 53 When war broke out, wary German merchants also resigned their offices in the organizations of the colony. 54 In general, the greater an individual's stake in the Mexican economy, the less he or she complied with the dictates from the German legation.
World War II dealt a crushing blow to Mexico's Germans. Before the German attack on France, the German colony had enjoyed relatively free rein in their activities. Aware of the fact that most Mexicans favored a strict position of neutrality, the strongly anti-fascist President Lázaro Cárdenas declared in May 1940 that his government did not worry about a fifth column in Mexico. But when the German armies attacked Western Europe, he promised the U.S. government to support the coordination of hemispheric defense in return for a favorable resolution of pending U.S.-Mexican disputes. By early 1941, his successor, Manuel Avila Camacho, had permitted U.S. agents to launch an intelligence campaign that destroyed the influence of the AO. 55 Finally, the state of war between the United States and the Axis powers led to a U.S.-Mexican alliance, as Avila Camacho declared that the war pitted democracies against dictatorships. 56 In December 1941, his government froze the assets of Axis nationals as well as of all Mexicans who traded with the Axis, and six months later, Mexico declared war on Germany following the sinking of two Mexican tankers by German submarines.
The existence of the German, Italian, and Japanese colonies, however, precluded a complete harmonization with U.S. interests. The Mexicans did not desire to punish its nationals whose only sin was to speak, look, or act German, Italian, or Japanese. The Mexican government also refused calls for the deportation of Nazi agents, whom it interned in an old fortress, and it did not expropriate German property as Guatemala, Brazil and other Latin American countries had done. Moreover, it allowed Germans born in Mexico to declare themselves Mexican citizens. These acts of insubordination rankled many State Department officials, one of whom criticized the Mexican government for its failure to crack down on nationals of "Germanic extraction whose known sympathies are pro-Axis". 57 Having foiled German geopolitical designs in Mexico, U.S. diplomats therefore focused on the destruction of the German colony. In this effort, the "Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals", which forbade U.S. citizens all commercial transactions with those on the list, proved most effective. Containing more than 2,000 names, the list ushered in a U.S. witch hunt in Mexico that ruined many legitimate small businesses. For example, the Division of War Trade Intelligence added a young photographer to the list because he had requested German films for his studio. 58 With Mexico a belligerent, the Proclaimed List achieved its desired effect. In June 1942, Avila Camacho placed all Axis firms and institutions under the supervision of the Junta de Administración y Vigilancia de la Propiedad Extranjera. Although the Mexican government returned most of the German companies after the war, the German colony never recovered from this blow. Because of the Junta's seizure of the Colegio Alemán and other German cultural institutions, World War II irretrievably shattered the divide that separated the German enclave from Mexican society.
59
The postwar era witnessed a blurring of the formerly sharp lines between the German colony and Mexican society. Mexican society had changed too much to accept the continued self-segregation of foreign colonies. Industrialization produced a formidable Mexican middle class, whose members did not accept the artificial barriers existing between foreign enclaves and Mexican society. More Mexican families began to enroll their children in the schools of the foreign colonies-schools that enjoyed an excellent reputation for their stringent curriculum and their bilingual education. Finally, within the German colony, the arrival of employees of multinational concerns marginalized the old merchant families. As most of these newcomers planned a relatively brief stay in Mexico City, the new arrivals further fragmented an already divided community.
The immigration restrictions of the Mexican state played an important role in this process. The end of the nineteenth-century policy of "whitening" Mexico had been long in coming, as a series of immigration reforms beginning in 1908 had sought to exclude first Asian, then poor, and finally almost all immigrants. The economic nationalism and xenophobia that accompanied the Revolution shifted the momentum toward encouraging the natural growth of the population and the naturalization of foreign immigrants. Soon, the rapid growth of the Mexican population and the increasing clout of the middle sectorsthe prime competition for foreign immigrants -made the government clamp down further on immigration. After the immigration reform of 1973, most immigrants only qualified for temporary visas, and obtaining permanent residency in Mexico became more difficult than receiving a "green card" for the United States. 60 Since only a continuing flow of immigrants could make up for the loss of people to remigration and (increasingly) miscegenation, these changes threatened the foreign colonies. Changes in Mexican society also encouraged assimilation. The Mexican elites and middle classes had gained self-confidence from victory in the war, and the abyss of totalitarianism had at last discredited the supposedly superior German ways. In addition, following the lead of the United States, Mexico began to produce mass culture appealing to the children and grandchildren of foreign immigrants. When young Mexicans used the new mass media to articulate their own version of the wave of counterculture made in the USA, their peers from foreign families discovered that it was "hip" to be Mexican. 61 Meanwhile, import-substitution industrialization produced a sizable group of urban nouveaux riches who soon discovered the value and prestige of the foreign institutions such as the Colegio Alemán. As Mexico City grew from a city of one million to a megalopolis of twenty million, the German colony became increasingly marginalized, and the use of Spanish more important. Today, almost all ethnic Germans born in Mexico -whether of the first or the sixth generation -consider Spanish their native language, and most of those who have learned German speak it with a Spanish accent. Finally, the last thirty years have witnessed an increasing number of mixed marriages between Germans and Mexicans, especially alumni of the German school.
62
The Colegio Alemán mirrored these changes. After the Junta's takeover in 1942, the school did not offer instruction in German until its re-privatization in 1948. As a result, the Mexican share of the student population increased to almost 75 percent, and Spanish became the language of currency among the students. In 1950, Rudolf Brechtel, the new principal of the Colegio Alemán, attempted to reverse the trend by mandating the exclusive use of German in the two kindergarten grades as well as in the first grade. While this mandate led to a bet-ter command of German, however, Brechtel could not dictate the language the children used on the school grounds, and Spanish remained dominant there. This trend only grew stronger during the 1960s and 1970s, as the teachers contracted in postwar Germany increasingly failed to connect with their conservative German and Mexican students. According to Blanca Huici, the former secretary of the Colegio Alemán, "slovenly dressed Hippie teachers" provided a pooradvertisement for German culture. To make matters worse, these teachers earned up to twenty times of the salary of their colleagues contracted in Mexico, including those who spoke perfect Spanish and German and thus possessed the best qualifications to teach in this bicultural school. Nonetheless, Mexican elite families, including those of former presidents Luis Echeverría and José López Portillo, continued to send their children to the German school. 63 Wealthy Mexicans still believed that knowledge of German culture improved the moral fabric of their children. 64 While it could not dissuade either Mexicans or Germans from attending the Colegio Alemán, the issue of the "Hippie teachers" highlighted the crisis in confidence that World War II left in the German colony. The citizens of imperial and Nazi Germany had held their heads high at a time when German science and military power jockeyed for world dominance, and they had often regarded the Mexicans as inferior people. With German unity shattered and the two successor states a pair of pawns on the Cold War chessboard, however, segregating oneself from Mexican society was hard to justify. Moreover, the Nazi past divided those who had actively participated in the dictatorship from those who had passively observed the situation, only to loudly proclaim their anti-Nazi leanings as soon as the war was over, not to mention from the refugees from Hitler's terror. A further gap existed between these three groups and returnees from Germany, who 295
The Life Cycle of a Trade Diaspora had lived through five years of aerial bombings and bitterly complained about the materialist attitude of the Germans in Mexico. In the view of these returnees, the German colony had enjoyed an easy ride in Mexico despite the Junta's and U.S. hostility. 65 Today, the old German colony has itself become marginalized within the community of German speakers in Mexico City. Between 1960 and 1990, almost 17,000 Germans came to Mexico, a third of them to the capital, and Germans ranked fourth on the list of immigrants, behind U.S. citizens, Spaniards, and Guatemalans. "Industrial nomads" on three-to five-year contracts, most of these newcomers work for multinational companies such as Volkswagen and plan to return to Germany at the conclusion of their contract. Secure in their jobs and better paid than most members of the old colony, these Germans are more alien to the members of the old colony than the Mexican alumni of the Colegio Alemán. Therefore, beyond the classroom, only tenuous links connect pre-1945 immigrants and their children to the German industrial nomads, who often show little interest in Mexican society. 66 It was not surprising, then, that the Asociación de Ayuda Social de la Colonia Alemana (the Social Assistance Association of the German Colony) recently changed the last two words of its name to Comunidad Alemana, or German community. Today, the German colony exists in name only, and the word "community" best expresses the looser ties that prevail among German speakers in Mexico City.
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For those who have cast their lot with Mexico -the members of the former enclave and their descendants -the road toward assimilation has not yet reached its conclusion. Even today, it remains advantageous to the German community to retain ties to German culture. Not only does bilingualism confer advantages to any individual, but things "American" and "European" also still retain a flavor of superiority in Mexico. Moreover, many Mexicans still consider the blonde, blueeyed descendants of German immigrants foreigners, despite their impeccable Spanish accent and Mexican mannerisms. Likewise, many German-Mexicans continue to feel privileged by their ethnicity, and some of them still treat Mexicans with disdain. 68 In a sense, the Germans in Mexico have come full circle: just as in the nineteenth century, the greater part of the German community looks forward to a brief stay in an exotic land, planning to return to Germany wealthier if not wiser. Just as the trade conquistadors, the industrial nomads maintain their social world in Germany and consider their stay in Mexico at best an exotic adventure, and at worst a necessary evil for professional advancement. Ultimately, the enclave phase was an exception, a product of an ultra-nationalist era in world and German history. And even in the enclave phase, the conservative, nationalist German merchants supported the imperialism of the German Empire or Nazi aggression only as long as their business interests dictated.
Why have German families in Mexico City have taken longer to acculturate than the much larger German communities in Argentina, Brazil, and the United States? Despite the efforts following the Mexican Revolution, Mexican national identity remains particularistic rather than inclusive (the traditional U.S. ideology of the "melting pot" serves as an example of the latter). In 19 th -century Mexico, the dominant constructions of national identity excluded both the indigenous population (as "dark" and provincial) and U.S. and European "foreigners" (as "white" and cosmopolitan). Language and physical appearance served as the common denominators in this equation. In this fashion, the Spanish-speaking creoles and mestizos considered themselves the "real Mexicans". While the indigenista propaganda after 1920 sought to exalt all Mexicans as a "cosmic race", the failure of the postrevolutionary regimes to live up to this idea undermined its credibility. Today, the same idea of the nation that oppresses indigenous people still benefits the foreigners: the "real Mexicans" consider themselves above the "Indians", but below Europeans and U.S.-Americans. As a group privileged in terms of both class and ethnicity, the German colony has therefore taken its good time becoming a part of Mexican society.
